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1103 
THE FCC’S ABANDONMENT OF SPONSORSHIP 
IDENTIFICATION REGULATION & 
ANONYMOUS SPECIAL INTEREST  
GROUP POLITICAL ADVERTISING  
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
“Voters have a right to know who is really behind all those glossy 
and sometimes wildly misleading ads we see on TV.”1  
—Former FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps, June 9, 2011 
 
The modern political landscape in the United States is one dominated 
by increasingly expensive political campaigns, funding from undisclosed 
donors, and barrages of political advertising. In the 2012 presidential 
election, candidates Barack Obama and Mitt Romney and their 
corresponding parties spent a total of $1.8 billion on their campaigns, and 
outside special interest groups spent an additional $550 million.
2
 Both 
candidates outspent counterparts in all previous presidential elections, and 
much of that spending went toward television advertisement.
3
 
Ensuring that voters know who is behind all those “glossy and 
sometimes wildly misleading ads” when viewing political advertisements 
has long been the duty of the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”), and it is an important one.4 With the ubiquity of political 
advertisements in today’s election cycles, voters would be hard pressed to 
escape the constant stream of political propaganda. Federal sponsorship 
identification law requires broadcasters to identify the individuals or 
groups sponsoring those persuasive political advertisements, and this area 
of law has a specific purpose: to protect “[t]he public’s basic right to know 
by whom it is being informed.”5 Theoretically, sponsorship 
 
 
 1. Press Release, Michael J. Copps, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement of Michael J. 
Copps on Release of FCC Staff Report: “The Technology and Information Needs of Communities” 
(June 9, 2011), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-307421A1.pdf, 
archived at https://perma.cc/SVZ6-5JGQ.  
 2. See infra note 75. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. Amendment of the Comm’n’s “Sponsorship Identification” Rules, 52 F.C.C.2d 701, 703 
(1975) (quoting Amendment of the Comm’n’s Sponsorship Identification Rules, 34 F.C.C.2d 1104, 
1105 (1972)). 
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announcements for political advertisements should be clueing viewers in 
to the identities of the special interest groups; such groups spend 
significant sums of money to ensure the election of candidates who 
promise to advance the groups’ agendas once in office. And theoretically, 
sponsorship identification law is written to reveal to viewers the identities 
of even those groups that would prefer to remain unknown. But in 
practice, the FCC and federal courts have stripped sponsorship 
identification law of its power to inform voters about the individuals and 
entities seeking to influence and persuade them. 
This Note examines the FCC’s historical and current approaches to 
sponsorship identification regulation in political advertisements and the 
resulting consequences for voting viewers in upcoming elections. Part II 
offers a brief primer on the development and current status of the 
sponsorship identification laws. Part III discusses the substance of the 
1944, 1963, and 1975 revisions to the law made by the FCC and Congress. 
This Part also takes note of the events and industry changes that prompted 
regulation revision and examines prominent enforcement decisions by the 
FCC and federal courts during that period. Part IV focuses on the growing 
prevalence of special interest group and political action committee 
(“PAC”) advertising and its effects on voters and the political landscape. 
Part V examines an FCC decision published in 2014 in which the 
Commission refused to enforce the regulations for two political 
advertisements sponsored by special interest groups. The analysis of the 
2014 decision situates the FCC’s response within the framework of the 
agency’s historical approach to the sponsorship identification regulations 
detailed in Part III. It also demonstrates how the Commission’s 
enforcement of these regulations has steadily whittled away the 
responsibilities that broadcasters have to their viewers. Finally, this Note 
concludes by exploring the consequences of the FCC’s current stance on 
enforcement for the broadcast industry, the public, special interest groups, 
and the Commission.  
II. A BRIEF PRIMER ON SPONSORSHIP IDENTIFICATION LAWS 
The federal government’s first attempt at regulating American airwaves 
occurred in 1927. Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927,
6
 implementing 
 
 
 6. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934). The Act created the 
Federal Radio Commission and bestowed on it a range of responsibilities, including classifying 
stations, assigning frequencies, overseeing technical aspects of radio broadcasting, and requiring equal 
access to air time for competing political candidates. Id. Overall, the statute directed the Federal Radio 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/9
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a slew of regulations related to the structure and function of the 
burgeoning radio industry. Among those regulations, the first sponsorship 
identification requirement slipped uneventfully into section 19 of the 
statute. The section required stations to orally identify any content for 
which they received consideration and the “person, firm, company, or 
corporation” furnishing that consideration or content.7 Within five years, 
Congress revisited the regulation of the communications industry and 
passed the Communications Act of 1934 (“Communications Act”),8 which 
provided for the creation of the FCC. The sponsorship identification 
provision in section 19 of the Radio Act of 1927 migrated into the new 
statute mostly unchanged.
9
 In 1944, the FCC promulgated its own 
 
 
Commission to base its decisions on “public convenience, interest, or necessity.” LAURENCE F. 
SCHMECKEBIER, THE FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES, AND ORGANIZATION 
17 (1932). 
 7. Radio Act of 1927 § 19 (“All matter broadcast by any radio station for which service, money, 
or any other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or promised to or charged or accepted 
by, the station so broadcasting, from any person, firm, company, or corporation, shall, at the time the 
same is so broadcast, be announced as paid for or furnished, as the case may be, by such person, firm, 
company, or corporation.”).  
 The provision brooked little controversy, but it had at least one outspoken critic in Representative 
Emanuel Celler of New York. Celler argued section 19 should provide even more transparency by 
requiring broadcasters to recognize sponsored content as “advertising,” rather than merely labeling it 
as “paid for” or “furnished by” a party. See Richard Kielbowicz & Linda Lawson, Unmasking Hidden 
Commercials in Broadcasting: Origins of the Sponsorship Identification Regulations, 1927-1963, 56 
FED. COMM. L.J. 327, 332 (2004). While the Radio Act of 1927 received attention, section 19 
appeared to raise little concern for contemporary commentators. ERWIN G. KRASNOW & LAWRENCE D. 
LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 10–13 (2d ed. 1978); see also Loveday v. FCC, 
707 F.2d 1443, 1451–52 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted) (“The contemporary literature thoroughly 
canvassed what were then thought to be the major provisions and purposes of the Act, and the 
sponsorship identification provision was hardly noticed. . . . [S]ection 19 provoked no controversy 
whatever.”). Moreover, the congressional debate and committee reports on the predecessor bills to the 
Radio Act show robust debate, but lawmakers spent next to no time discussing the provision. See 
Loveday, 707 F.2d at 1449–52 (discussing at length the versions and amendments to the bills 
preceding the Radio Act of 1927 and taking note that the sponsorship identification provision garnered 
no debate). 
 8. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The statute replaced the Federal Radio Commission with the FCC, 
and granted it the broad authority to regulate as “public convenience, interest, or necessity require[d].” 
Communications Act of 1934 § 303; see also KRASNOW & LONGLEY, supra note 7, at 13–14. The 
Communications Act revamped the old organization’s structure, tasking the new agency with greater 
authority over more aspects of the communication industry, and setting long-range social goals for the 
agency. KRASNOW & LONGLEY, supra note 7, at 13–14. 
 9. Compare Communications Act of 1934 § 317, with Radio Act of 1927 § 19. The only 
difference between the two statutes is that the Radio Act of 1927 required a sponsorship announcement 
when a station received consideration or payment from any “person, firm, company, or corporation.” 
Radio Act of 1927 § 19. The original § 317 of the Communications Act only required an 
announcement when a station received consideration or payment from any “person.” Communications 
Act of 1934 § 317. At first glance, this difference could be said to signal a significant change in the 
legislative intent to limit the sponsorship identification requirements to individual sponsors; however, 
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sponsorship identification regulations.
10
 Through Commission and 
Congressional action, sponsorship identification laws have been 
substantively amended on four occasions—1960,11 1975,12 1992,13 and 
2012.
14
 The current regulations largely match section 317 of the 
Communications Act, though the former contains additional specifications 
for the announcements.
15
 
The current regulations can be understood as imposing three general 
duties on broadcasters: (1) the general announcement requirement; (2) the 
reasonable diligence requirement; and (3) the duty to disclose the ultimate 
or true sponsor. First, the general announcement requirement directs 
broadcasters to make an announcement for any content aired in exchange 
for money or other consideration, and broadcasters must announce “[b]y 
whom or on whose behalf” the payment was made.16 In simpler terms, 
broadcasters must identify airtime that has been paid for, and they must 
identify who paid for it. Second, the regulations require broadcasters to 
“exercise reasonable diligence to obtain from [their] employees” and 
others any information necessary to make the sponsorship 
 
 
the legislative history shows no discussion of this change, nor does the FCC’s enforcement of the 1934 
law in the years after its passage indicate the Commission applied the law only to individuals. Again, 
the legislative history around the Communications Act does not indicate that any lawmakers voiced 
concern about the provision. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1918, at 47 (1934) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 73-
781, at 8 (1934); H.R. REP. NO. 73-1850, at 7 (1934). In addition to integrating the provision, the 
Communications Act also authorized the FCC to promulgate other regulations as necessary to achieve 
the goals of the statute. Communications Act of 1934 § 303(f). 
 10. Announcement of Sponsored Programs, 9 Fed. Reg. 14,734 (Dec. 19, 1944).  
 11. Unlike the other revisions discussed herein, the 1960 revision of the sponsorship 
identification requirements came from an amendment of the Communications Act. Communications 
Act Amendments, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-752, 74 Stat. 889, 895–96 (1960). In 1963, the FCC amended 
its regulations to match the 1960 amendments to the Communications Act. Applicability of 
Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141 (1963).  
 12. Amendment of the Comm’n’s “Sponsorship Identification” Rules, 52 F.C.C.2d 701, 713 
(1975) (codified as amended at 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2016)). 
 13. Sponsorship Identification Requirements, 57 Fed. Reg. 8278 (Mar. 9, 1992) (codified as 
amended at 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212). This Note will not discuss the 1992 revisions to the sponsorship 
identification regulations in depth. The 1992 revisions pertain to the technical aspects of the visual 
sponsorship announcement, which are not relevant to the discussion in this Note. Id. at 8279 (requiring 
broadcasters to visually announce a sponsor using text covering four percent of the vertical height of 
the TV image for a period of four consecutive seconds). 
 14. Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure Requirements for Television Broadcast Licensee 
Public Interest Obligations, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,631 (May 11, 2012) (codified as amended at 47 C.F.R. 
§ 73.1212). This Note will also not discuss the 2012 revisions to the regulations. See infra note 21. 
 15. See infra notes 16–21 and accompanying text; cf. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 315, 317 (2014). 
 16. Sponsorship Identification, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(a) (2016). This portion of the regulations 
remains consistent with the language in the Radio Act of 1927, and applies to both commercial and 
political content aired by broadcasters. See id.; supra note 6. In its current version, section 317(a) of 
the Communications Act contains functionally identical language.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/9
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announcement.
17
 On its face, this language imposes a duty on broadcasters 
to go beyond blindly accepting information provided by or about the 
purported sponsor of a political advertisement. Third, the regulations 
require broadcasters to “fully and fairly disclose the true identity of the 
person or persons . . . or other entity by whom or on whose behalf 
[payment or consideration for the advertisement] is made.”18 The 
regulation further clarifies that where the entity paying for the 
advertisement acts on behalf of another and “such fact is known or by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence . . . could be known to the station, the 
announcement shall disclose the identity” of the person or entity on whose 
behalf the advertisement is placed.
19
 The language of this final 
requirement builds upon the duty imposed by the second to exercise 
“reasonable diligence.”20 Broadcasters are prohibited from willfully 
ignoring situations in which a middleman purports to be the true sponsor 
of an advertisement, and the regulations unequivocally require that 
broadcasters identify the true sponsor in those instances. Though the 
regulations impose other requirements on broadcasters, the three 
aforementioned duties are most relevant for the purpose of this Note.
21
  
 
 
 17. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(b). In addition to requiring the broadcaster to obtain information from 
its employees, the regulations also specify that the same diligence is required to obtain information 
from “other persons with whom it deals directly in connection with any matter for broadcast.” Id. 
Identical language appears in section 317(c) of the amended Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. § 317(c) 
(2014). This latter category of individuals appears to be relatively broad, but neither the regulations 
nor the section of the statute appear to have spawned any litigation or clarification through 
enforcement decisions as to who specifically may or may not be included in that group. In relation to 
the requirement cited here, it also bears noting that section 73.1212(c) of the regulations and section 
317(b) of the Communications Act reference section 508 of the Communications Act, which imposes 
criminal liability for any station employee who fails to provide information relating to payment 
accepted for air time. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(c); 47 U.S.C. § 317(b); 47 U.S.C. § 507.  
 18. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(e) (emphasis added).  
 19. Id. (emphasis added).  
 20. Id. § 73.1212(b). 
 21. The other duties imposed on broadcasters comprise two additional categories to the three 
categories mentioned above. Fourth, the regulations also prescribe technical requirements for the 
sponsorship announcement, including the size of the text for the visual sponsorship announcement, the 
length of time it must remain on the screen, and the number of times it must be made during the course 
of the advertisement. Id. §§ 73.1212(a)(2)(ii), (d). Fifth, the regulations specify that when a 
broadcaster airs political content sponsored by a corporation or other business entity, it must retain a 
political file, accessible to the public for a period of two years, listing the chief executive officers or 
board members of the sponsoring entity. Id. § 73.1212(e). Prior to the 2012 revision, the regulations 
specified the file should be kept at the broadcaster’s physical station location; the revision then 
required broadcasters to upload the files to the FCC’s public database. Standardized and Enhanced 
Disclosure Requirements for Television Broadcast Licensee Public Interest Obligations, 77 Fed. Reg. 
39,439, 39,440 (July 3, 2012) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73). 
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III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT & ENFORCEMENT OF SPONSORSHIP 
IDENTIFICATION LAW 
In the thirty years following the FCC’s promulgation of the 1944 
regulations, the Commission inched toward providing the public with 
greater information about sponsors.
22
 After 1975, however, the 
Commission’s enforcement decisions evidenced a sea change. Since that 
time, the FCC has slowly stripped meaning from the regulatory provisions 
requiring broadcasters to exercise reasonable diligence and identify the 
true sponsors of political content, leaving the public with incomplete or 
inaccurate information about the advertisers who seek to persuade them.
23
 
A. The Early Years of Enforcement Under the Communications Act and 
the Commission’s New Regulations  
In the years leading up to American involvement in World War II, 
business and labor movement voices competed for the opportunity to 
present their political viewpoints on the radio.
24
 The incidence of 
unattributed political messaging on the airwaves increased as the 1944 
presidential election between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Thomas Dewey 
neared, prompting the FCC to remind broadcasters that section 317 of the 
Communications Act applied to political content.
25
 In December 1944, the 
Commission unveiled its first set of regulations governing sponsorship 
identification for commercial, political, and otherwise “controversial” 
content.
26
 Like the statute, the regulations were limited, only imposing on 
broadcasters a general duty to identify sponsored content. 
Nevertheless, broadcasters soon sought further clarification as to “the 
nature of the burden of investigation” imposed on them to identify 
sponsors and the process by which the FCC would determine whether that 
burden had been satisfied.
27
 The Commission provided guidance in a 
 
 
 22. See infra Parts III.A–C. 
 23. See infra Part III.D. 
 24. Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 7, at 339–41.  
 25. Id. at 339. On October 18, 1944, the Commission published a brief notice citing “numerous 
complaints” it had received regarding the “failure of radio stations to identify the sponsors of political 
spot announcements.” Identification of Sponsors, Notice to All Station Licenses, 9 Fed. Reg. 12,817 
(Oct. 25, 1944). The notice also reminded broadcasters that a “full and fair disclosure” of the sponsor’s 
identity was necessary. Id. 
 26. Announcement of Sponsored Programs, 9 Fed. Reg. 14,734 (Dec. 19, 1944). The regulations 
largely mirrored the language of section 317. See id; Communications Act of 1934 §§ 315, 317. 
 27. Albuquerque Broad. Co., 40 F.C.C. 1 (1946). The Albuquerque Broadcasting Company 
wrote to the Commission seeking guidance on a related sponsorship identification issue, and the 
Commission replied on May 16, 1946, with the public letter. Id.; infra note 28. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/9
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public letter to the Albuquerque Broadcasting Company, writing that the 
regulations required broadcasters to take “all reasonable measures” of 
investigation to determine the sponsors of political messages, and that the 
measure of the reasonableness of the investigation varied by the 
circumstances of each case.
28
 The Commission’s position recognized the 
public’s right to a certain level of information about the identity of a 
sponsor, but acknowledged that the actions expected of the broadcaster in 
investigating and providing that information may well vary from one 
announcement to the next.
29
 More importantly, it suggested broadcasters 
would have to conduct some investigation in order to meet their regulatory 
burden, a position it has since abandoned.
30
  
B. The Payola Scandal Prompts a Congressional Amendment to the 
Communications Act and the FCC Abashedly Follows Suit 
In the late 1950s, the “payola” scandal grabbed the attention of the 
American public and Congress, ultimately prompting a revision of the 
Communications Act and the FCC’s regulations. The term “payola” most 
often referred to the practice of record companies secretly paying disc 
jockeys to play certain songs on the air; disc jockeys, of course, made no 
sponsorship announcement or acknowledgment of the consideration they 
received.
31
 The consideration disc jockeys received ranged from cash to 
 
 
 28. Albuquerque Broad. Co., 40 F.C.C. at 1. The Commission also clarified, in response to 
inquiry by the Albuquerque Broadcasting Company, that a broadcaster’s undertaking of greater 
investigation for some political content than for others did not violate other sections of the 
Communications Act. Id. Namely, section 315 of the Communications Act required that broadcasters 
provide equal opportunities for use of the broadcast station’s services for all candidates for a public 
office. Communications Act of 1934 § 315. The FCC assured the Albuquerque Broadcasting Company 
that “impos[ing] different requirements of proof of source-of-funds” would not create unequal 
opportunities between candidates. Albuquerque Broad. Co., 40 F.C.C. at 1. To illustrate, the FCC 
provided an example in which a broadcaster would reasonably be expected to take greater 
investigative steps to determine the identity of the sponsor: “For example, if a speaker desires to 
purchase time at a cost apparently disproportionate to his personal ability to pay, a licensee should 
make an investigation of the source of the funds to be used for payment.” Id. 
 29. Albuquerque Broad. Co., 40 F.C.C. at 1. The Commission left the door open to provide 
further indication in the future of what it would deem to be reasonable steps. However, in the 
following decades, the requirement of “reasonable investigation” scarcely grew any clearer. See infra 
Part V.  
 30. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 31. The term “payola” broadly applies to two practices investigated by Congress beginning in 
1959: the practice of record companies secretly paying radio disc jockeys to encourage them to play 
particular songs on the radio and the rigging of television quiz shows. See generally KERRY SEGRAVE, 
PAYOLA IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: A HISTORY, 1880–1991 (1994). Lawmakers took an interest in 
payola because it clearly violated the sponsorship identification regulations: music that had been 
quietly paid for in the form of money or gifts to disc jockeys was being played on the air without any 
acknowledgement of the gratuity. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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lavish travel and gifts.
32
 Though the public controversy over pay-for-play 
on the radio had been brewing for several years,
33
 Congress did not launch 
an official probe into the radio industry’s payola practice until November 
1959.
34
 While Congress conducted its investigation, the FCC belatedly 
took its own actions to address the problem. The Commission warned 
broadcasters that their practices were illegal and later sent out an inquiry to 
all licensed stations asking for an account of their payola practices.
35
 
 
 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. The fact of the payments to disc jockeys was well known and a frequent topic of 
commentary for contemporary news outlets. Id. at 86–99. Interestingly, much of the commentary 
appeared to be prompted by the rise of the rock ‘n’ roll genre; many commentators assumed disc 
jockeys increasingly played the new music only because of the payments they received, and they 
faulted the deejays for the popularity of the controversial and highly criticized musical style. Id. at 
125–26. Among the factors that caused Congress to initiate a formal probe was a memorandum from 
the president of the American Guild of Authors and Composers claiming there was “no doubt that 
commercial bribery has become a prime factor in determining” the music on the radio, and it was also 
responsible for “surreptitiously [inducing the public] to buy.” Id. at 100. Even after the government 
investigations took off, the public’s interest remained high and many publications continued to foretell 
“the death of rock and roll.” Id. at 137. 
 34. The House of Representatives Committee on Legislative Oversight ran the most highly 
publicized investigation, and it held public hearings to interview disc jockeys from across the country. 
Id. at 126. The Congressional probe created a disc jockey witch-hunt. Id. at 105–10. Both before, 
during, and after Congress launched its formal investigation, many disc jockeys were fired from radio 
stations as broadcasters hastened to correct their conduct. Id. 
 The Internal Revenue Service, the District Attorney of New York County, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and the FCC were also investigating the payola practices independent of the 
Congressional probe. See id. at 100. The District Attorney’s investigation in New York later ended in 
the indictment of eight station employees, who were all charged with commercial bribery. Id. at 150. 
The IRS investigations also later yielded criminal charges for tax evasion. Id. at 153. 
 35. Id. at 101–17. After warning broadcasters at least twice that accepting payment for playing 
music violated the sponsorship identification regulations, the Commission sent an inquiry to each 
licensed broadcaster. Id. The inquiry demanded disclosure of any payments received by employees for 
broadcasts that were not accompanied by sponsorship announcements, and it required broadcasters to 
identify steps they planned to take to prevent future instances of payola. Id. Broadcasters saw these 
demands as “sudden and unexpected,” suggesting they had previously been engaging in the practice 
under the assumption that no real threat of FCC sanction existed. Id. at 117. 
 In an attempt to take hold of the payola problem, the Commission even went so far as to withhold 
broadcaster licenses for violations—something it had never done before. Id. at 138. Upon receiving 
responses to the inquiry that the Commission sent to all licensees, the FCC withheld the licenses of 
four stations for, inter alia, partaking in payola practices. Id. The responses indicated that nearly all 
broadcasters engaged in some form of payola, with the vast majority accepting free records from 
record companies. Id. at 138. The FCC quickly moved to implement a new rule requiring that stations 
make an announcement before playing a record that they had received for free. Id. The hasty rule 
change appeared to be largely aimed at appeasing the Congressional investigators, as evidenced by the 
Commission’s decision to dispense with the notice and comment portion of its usual rulemaking 
process, its omission of an effective date for the new rule, and the resulting confusion amongst its own 
members about the new rule’s interpretation. Id. at 140–42. The 1960 amendments to the 
Communications Act later undid the FCC’s new rule, relieving broadcasters of the duty because of the 
hardship caused by having to make sponsorship announcements for each and every song it played. 
Communications Act Amendments, 1960, § 317(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 86-752, 74 Stat. 889, 895 (codified 
as amended at 47 U.S.C § 317(a)(1) (2014)); see also Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 7, at 356. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/9
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These hasty steps proved inadequate in placating those who pointed 
fingers at the FCC for allowing payola to become a rampant practice and 
an open “secret” in the radio business.36 The Commission received the 
majority of the blame, and the Congressional probe even questioned 
whether Commission members were themselves involved in condoning or 
partaking in the practice.
37
 
After conducting its investigation, Congress revised the 
Communications Act in 1960 and made a major change to sponsorship 
identification law, and the FCC followed suit.
38
 The new provisions in 
section 317 created the reasonable diligence requirement. The amended 
law required broadcasters to exercise “reasonable diligence to obtain from 
its employees, and from other persons with whom it deals directly,” the 
information necessary to make a full and accurate sponsorship 
announcement.
39
 The simplistic requirements imposed by the Radio Act of 
 
 
 36. SEGRAVE, supra note 31, at 138. Representative Emanuel Celler—the same Congressman 
who had criticized section 19 of the Radio Act of 1927 for not going far enough to identify sponsored 
announcements—also harshly criticized the Commission. See supra note 6. Celler denounced payola 
as the “kind of corruption that should have been dealt with years ago by the Federal agency charged 
with primary responsibility in this area – the Federal Communications Commission.” SEGRAVE, supra 
note 31, at 137. Despite common knowledge of the payola practice, the Commission had undeniably 
been lax in its enforcement of the sponsorship identification regulations. The laxity may be explained 
by two factors: the political ideology of the Commission’s members and the changing nature of the 
broadcast industry that the Commission was tasked with regulating. Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 
7, at 354. First, the Commission members could have been described as “disinclined to regulate 
broadcast content, an ideological bent reinforced by personal and political ties to broadcasters.” Id. 
Second, the changing nature of television and radio programming made it easier for broadcasters to 
hide when they aired sponsored content. Id. at 355.  
 37. The House subcommittee eventually brought in FCC Chairman John Doerfer to testify in the 
investigation. SEGRAVE, supra note 31, at 139. Doerfer’s testimony raised questions about whether he 
himself had accepted benefits from players in the broadcasting industry. Doerfer had connections to 
George Storer of Storer Broadcasting Company, the owner of several radio and television stations. Id. 
He and his wife spent several days vacationing with Storer, using Storer’s private plane and yacht 
without reimbursing him. Id. The leader of the House subcommittee, Representative Oren S. Harris, 
pointed out that Doerfer’s conduct seemed very similar to that of the disc jockeys. Id. Doerfer met with 
President Dwight Eisenhower after testifying before the subcommittee and resigned from his position. 
Id. Another member of the Commission also resigned after it was revealed that he accepted money 
from a licensed station. Id. 
 38. Communications Act Amendments, 1960, § 8, Pub. L. No. 86-752, 74 Stat. 889, 895 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2014)). After the lengthy investigation and publicized 
scandal, the passage of the amendments to the statute garnered much debate and disagreement in both 
chambers of Congress. See SEGRAVE, supra note 31, at 156. The FCC announced its new regulations 
in 1963. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141, 143–44 (1963) (codified as 
amended at 47 C.F.R. § 73.119 (1964)).  
 39. Communications Act Amendments, 1960 § 8. In addition, the newly added section 508 of the 
Act required that broadcast employees “disclose the fact of such acceptance or agreement [of payment 
for broadcast of content]” to their employers. Id. Failure to make such disclosure carried a criminal 
penalty of a fine of not more than $10,000 and/or up to a year of imprisonment. Id. Despite the 
vigorous disparagement of the practice, the revision to the Communications Act did not illegalize 
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1927, the original version of the Communications Act, and the FCC’s 
original regulations were gone.
40
 The more expansive and specific 
regulations set forth in the 1960 revision meant broadcasters could no 
longer be willfully blind to the practices of sponsors attempting to air 
content anonymously or disguised as other entities. As a result, viewers 
received more frequent and consistent notice that aired content was 
sponsored, but this victory for public policy was short lived.
41
 
C. United States v. WHAS and the Commission’s Response 
In 1964, after much public critique, the FCC put its newly expanded 
regulations to work, and the focus shifted from the reasonable diligence 
required of broadcasters to whether broadcasters were accurately 
identifying the true sponsors of paid content.
42
 In In re WHAS,
43
 the 
Commission found the broadcaster in violation of the regulations by 
failing to identify the true sponsor of a political advertisement that 
disparaged a candidate in the 1963 Kentucky gubernatorial race.
44
 
According to the Commission, WHAS originally knew the sponsor to be a 
PAC named Business Friends for Breathitt, which was openly affiliated 
with candidate Ned Breathitt; but, at the request of the agency placing the 
ad, WHAS changed the announcement to identify the Committee for Good 
 
 
payola—it merely required broadcasters to acknowledge to the public when they or their employees 
were engaging in it. See SEGRAVE, supra note 31, at 157. Nevertheless, the imposition of a criminal 
penalty was a significant change aimed at exposing payola, which had been an open secret prior to 
1960. Id.  
 While payola concerns were clearly reflected in the revisions to the Act, Congress also took the 
opportunity to explicitly indicate that political or “controversial issue” content aired by broadcasters 
was subject to the same sponsorship announcement requirements. Communications Act Amendments, 
1960 § 8 (“Nothing in this section shall preclude the Commission from requiring that an appropriate 
announcement shall be made at the time of the broadcast in the case of any political program or any 
program involving the discussion of any controversial issue for which any films, records, 
transcriptions, talent, scripts, or other material or service of any kind have been furnished, without 
charge or at a nominal charge, directly or indirectly, as an inducement to the broadcast of such 
program.”). 
 40. See supra notes 7, 9 and accompanying text. 
 41. See infra Part III.D. 
 42. The first broadcaster to feel the Commission’s renewed vigor for enforcement was a 
Kentucky television station, WHAS-TV. See Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
The WHAS matter also appears to be the first prominent case in which the Commission took issue 
with the sponsorship announcement in the broadcast of political content. Id. (discussing the history of 
the sponsorship identification regulations and prominent decisions by the Commission).  
 43. WHAS, Inc., 40 F.C.C. 190 (1964). 
 44. On a “closely divided vote,” the Commission concluded that WHAS willfully committed the 
violation. United States v. WHAS, Inc., 385 F.2d 784, 785 (6th Cir. 1967). 
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Government (“CGG”) as the sponsor.45 The FCC acted quickly in filing a 
forfeiture action, finding that WHAS “knew or should have known” that 
Breathitt was the true sponsor.
46
 The Commission specified that under the 
regulations WHAS did not have the option to choose between identifying 
the true sponsor and the apparent sponsor because the regulations 
definitively demanded the former.
47
 Federal courts quickly turned the 
Commission’s interpretation of its regulations on its head.48 The Sixth 
 
 
 45. In communicating with the advertising agency preparing the content for broadcast, the station 
had initially been told that the sponsor of the advertisement was “Business Friends for Breathitt,” a 
group working in support of gubernatorial candidate Ned Breathitt. WHAS, Inc., 40 F.C.C. at 191. The 
program, a thirty-minute special reviewing the years Breathitt’s opponent A.B. Chandler had spent in 
political office, proclaimed itself as “the true story of what A.B. Chandler has done for, and to, 
Kentuckians.” Id. Within a week of identifying Business Friends for Breathitt and prior to the airing of 
the advertisement, the advertising agency changed the sponsor to the “Committee for Good 
Government,” and the station aired the content using the latter name in the sponsorship announcement. 
Id. Despite the advertising agency informing WHAS of the new sponsor for the program, the contract 
between the two parties named the sponsor as the “Committee for Good Government for Ned 
Breathitt.” Id. Nevertheless, the station eliminated Breathitt’s name from the sponsorship 
announcement, presumably at the request of the advertisement agency. Id. at 192. 
 46. Id. Less than a month after the airing of the special, the FCC issued a Notice of Apparent 
Liability, notifying WHAS of its violation of section 317(a) of the Communications Act and its 
liability for forfeiture under section 503(b)(1)(B) in the amount of $1,000. Id. at 196. 
Section 503(b)(1)(B) authorized the Commission to impose a maximum fee of $1,000 for every 
instance in which a licensed broadcaster “willfully or repeatedly” violated one of its regulations or a 
provision of the Communications Act. Communications Act Amendments, 1960 § 7 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 503 (2014)).  
 47. The Commission found WHAS’s actions to be “an extremely serious violation” of the 
regulations. WHAS, Inc., 40 F.C.C. at 192. WHAS’s primary argument against the Commission’s 
interpretation required a close reading of the regulations. See id. Subsection (c) of section 3.654, which 
codified the sponsorship identification requirements for TV stations that applied to radio stations, 
specified that a sponsorship announcement had to identify the sponsor “by whom or in whose behalf 
such payment is made or promised.” Id. at 190 n.2 (emphasis added). WHAS argued that the phrase 
quoted above required only an identification of either the paying sponsor or the true sponsor. Id. at 
192. The FCC dismissed this argument by citing subsection (c) of section 3.654, which instructed:  
Where an agent or other person contracts or otherwise makes arrangements with a station on 
behalf of another, and such fact is known to the station, the announcement shall disclose the 
identity of the person or persons in whose behalf such agent is acting instead of the name of 
such agent.  
Id. This eliminated any choice the broadcaster had between identifying the apparent sponsor or the true 
sponsor. 
 48. The Commission filed the action in federal court when WHAS refused to pay the fine. See 
supra note 46. Section 504 as amended by the 1960 amendments to the Communications Act provided 
that the forfeitures authorized in section 503 could be collected by the Commission in a legal action. 
Communications Act Amendments, 1960 § 7 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 504 (2014)). In the 
forfeiture action to recover the fine against WHAS, a Kentucky district court sided with WHAS. 
United States v. WHAS, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 603 (W.D. Ky. 1966). The court found that the 
Commission’s regulations, as written, did not require the broadcaster to identify Breathitt as the true 
sponsor of the political content and that WHAS “had no reasonable basis for doubting, challenging or 
otherwise investigating the sponsorship and financing information furnished by [the advertising 
agency].” Id. at 605. The court reached this holding despite acknowledging that the political content 
clearly aimed to support Breathitt’s candidacy. Id. at 604. Calling the Commission’s interpretation of 
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Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the FCC’s argument that the regulations 
required Breathitt to be identified as the sponsor because the CGG had 
acted on his behalf and with his funding.
49
 The court’s examination of the 
plain language of the statute did not support the FCC’s interpretation; 
instead, the court believed that WHAS could properly identify either the 
apparent sponsor or the true sponsor and still meet its regulatory duties.
50
  
In 1975, the FCC responded to the outcome in United States v. WHAS, 
Inc. by making a key amendment to its regulations, imposing on 
broadcasters the duty to identify the true sponsors behind paid content.
51
 
The new regulations required that “[w]here an agent . . . makes 
arrangements with a station on behalf of another, and such fact is known 
[or should be known] to the station,” the broadcaster “shall disclose the 
identity of the person or persons in whose behalf such agent is acting 
instead of the name of such agent” in the sponsorship announcement.52 In 
other words, broadcasters were to name the ultimate sponsors, not the 
middlemen. The clarification of this duty was to be read in conjunction 
with the reasonable diligence requirement.
53
 The Commission explicitly 
announced its intent in promulgating the amended regulations:  
[W]here a political broadcast is presented, promoting one candidate 
directly or through criticism of his opponent, by a committee which 
is really a campaign instrumentality for a candidate or a political 
organization, the public should be made plainly aware of the latter 
 
 
the regulations “novel” because it required broadcasters to identify the true sponsor, the court found 
that the station did not willfully violate any of the Commission’s regulations. Id. at 606. The opinion 
also took a chiding tone with the Commission for attempting to rein in the efforts of the CGG. Id. 
After recognizing that the CGG had existed as a political committee for years, the court stated its 
opinion on the FCC’s efforts:  
The use of such committees, desirable or undesirable as it may be, has long been 
countenanced by those in the Federal and State Governments having authority therefor and I 
find no basis for substituting the Commission as a self-annointed [sic] arbiter of political 
morality through a novel interpretation of Commission Rules and Regulations.  
Id. 
 49. United States v. WHAS, Inc., 385 F.2d 784, 786 (6th Cir. 1967). In its brief, the FCC alleged 
that the regulations required that:  
[I]f the ostensible sponsoring committee is not in fact independent of the candidate and his 
campaign organization, but is acting in his behalf, with the funds coming directly or indirectly 
from the candidate or his organization[,] the licensee who knows or has reason to know the 
facts must identify the candidate on whose behalf the program is broadcast.  
Id.  
 50. Id. 
 51. See generally Amendment of the Comm’n’s Sponsorship Identification Rules, 52 F.C.C.2d 
701 (1975). 
 52. Id. at 702. 
 53. Id. at 709.  
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fact. The public’s basic right to know by whom it is being informed, 
particularly as to a political matter . . . is too basic to need lengthy 
discussion here.
54
 
The Commission, perhaps still fresh from the stinging criticisms it 
received after the payola scandals, took a decisive step to require greater 
disclosure from broadcasters—something it had seemed unwilling to do 
before.
55
 As in 1963, the development seemed to be a strong move toward 
providing the public with more information, but when the Commission 
began to enforce the new regulations in earnest, all forward progress 
stalled. 
D. Enforcement of Sponsorship Identification Regulations in the Era of 
Special Interest Group Political Advertising 
Almost immediately, the Commission’s enforcement of the 1975 
revisions indicated that the agency sought to retreat from the new 
regulatory burden it had imposed.
56
 Loveday v. FCC
57
 definitively 
 
 
 54. Id. at 703.  
 55. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.  
 56. In the matter of VOTER, the harbinger to Loveday v. FCC, discussed below, a group of 
concerned citizens, collectively called VOTER, complained to the FCC that local broadcasters aired 
messages opposing an upcoming ballot initiative related to the establishment of a county utilities 
agency and misidentified the true sponsor of the content. Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1456 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983) (citing VOTER, 46 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 350 (1979)). The stations identified the sponsor as 
“Westchester Citizens Against Government Takeover” (“WCAGT”), but VOTER alleged that the true 
sponsor was Consolidated Edison (“ConEd”), a public utilities company opposing the initiative. Id. In 
response to the Commission’s inquiry, WCAGT acknowledged that “substantial” funding came from 
ConEd, but it assured the Commission that ConEd exercised no control over the content of the political 
messaging and that ConEd employees were ineligible for membership in WCAGT. Id. The 
Commission found that the stations had the option to identify either ConEd or WCAGT as the sponsor 
to satisfy their responsibilities under the regulations, but they were not required to name ConEd. Id. 
Moreover, the Commission found the stations had acted “in good faith and without closing their eyes 
to any attempted misrepresentation.” Id. (citing VOTER, 46 Rad Reg. 2d (P&F) at 352). While the 
holding seemed to controvert the argument the Commission made in WHAS, the agency reasoned that 
the stations were free to identify either group as the sponsor because the stations had acted reasonably 
in accepting WCAGT’s representation that it controlled editorial content of political messaging. Id. 
Nevertheless, the Commission recognized that the substantial funding to WCAGT from ConEd “might 
suggest” that further investigation was necessary to determine the identity of the sponsor, if WCAGT 
had not made assurances to the stations that it was the true sponsor. Id. at 1456 (citing VOTER, 46 
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 352). 
 The main difference between the facts in WHAS and in VOTER appears to be that the purported 
true sponsors (Breathitt and ConEd, respectively) varied in whether they exercised editorial control 
over the messaging of political advertisement. In WHAS, no record indicates whether the Breathitt 
political action committee made any assurances about its lack of editorial control over CGG. See supra 
notes 44–49 and accompanying text. To square the VOTER holding with WHAS, it must be assumed 
that if CGG had claimed that candidate Breathitt’s campaign had no editorial control over the political 
advertisement, the Commission may not have found WHAS in violation of the regulations for failing 
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indicated this retreat. In response to a public complaint, the FCC 
investigated the sponsorship announcements California broadcasters made 
in relation to political advertisements opposing a state ballot measure to 
limit cigarette smoking in public.
58
 The broadcasters identified the sponsor 
as Californians Against Regulatory Excess (“CARE”), but the complainant 
alleged that large tobacco companies provided CARE with virtually all of 
its funding and selected and hired the advertising agency that produced the 
advertisement.
59
 The Commission found that the broadcasters had acted 
with reasonable diligence to ensure the accuracy of the sponsorship 
announcement by accepting the assurance provided by the apparent 
sponsor.
60
 The broadcasters could have reasonably identified either CARE 
or the tobacco industry, but the regulations did not obligate them to name 
the latter under the “true sponsor” requirement.61 The D.C. Circuit Court 
 
 
to identify the true sponsor. However, the Commission argued before the Sixth Circuit that Breathitt 
was the only sponsor who could properly be named because CGG had acted on his behalf. United 
States v. WHAS, 385 F.2d 784, 786 (6th Cir. 1967). That argument tugs against the Commission’s 
reasoning in VOTER. 
 57. Loveday, 707 F.2d 1443. 
 58. See generally id. 
 59. Ninety-eight percent of the funding for CARE came from the tobacco companies. Id. at 
1445–46 n.1. “Yes on 10,” a political action committee working for the passage of the proposition, and 
one of its members, Paul Loveday, spearheaded the effort to get the FCC involved. Id. at 1446. Later, 
Loveday would be the named complainant in the court case against the FCC. Id. at 1445. According to 
Loveday and Yes on 10, the tobacco industry had historically involved itself in advertising against 
similar measures and was likely repeating the practice in this instance. Id. Initially, Yes on 10 
communicated its concerns to the broadcasters directly, detailing why it believed the sponsorship 
announcements were incorrect. Id. A member of Yes on 10 wrote letters to the 155 radio and television 
stations that were broadcasting CARE’s advertisements, advising them of their violation of the 
sponsorship identification regulations. Id. at 1446. The group believed that representation of the 
advertisement’s sponsor as a California civic entity (here, CARE) obscured key facts, namely that the 
money and support came almost exclusively from out-of-state sources in the tobacco industry and that 
the tobacco industry donors had selected and hired an advertising firm for CARE. Id. at 1445. Yes on 
10 also alleged the tobacco companies provided the advertising funding to CARE after the state’s 
campaign finance reporting deadline to purposely avoid detection of their involvement. Id. 1445–46 
n.1. In response to the Yes on 10 letters, CARE sent its own letters to the broadcasters, acknowledging 
that it received funding from the tobacco industry, but assuring the group that the tobacco companies 
did not exercise control over CARE and were using a “hands-off approach” in making donations to 
groups opposing the measure. Id. at 1446. Nevertheless, Yes on 10 urged the broadcasters to change 
the sponsorship announcement to “Paid for by the Tobacco Industry,” instead of identifying CARE. Id. 
at 1445–46. It also threatened the initiation of a complaint with the FCC if the stations failed to act. Id. 
at 1446. When the broadcasters did not change their sponsorship announcements, Yes on 10 sought a 
declaratory ruling from the FCC. Id. 
 60. Loveday, 707 F.2d at 1447. Specifically, the FCC based its decision on CARE’s assurance to 
the broadcasters that the tobacco companies did not exercise any editorial control over the 
advertisement. Id. It is unclear whether any of the broadcasters took affirmative steps to meet their 
reasonable diligence requirement. Despite this seeming lack of affirmative investigation, the FCC was 
satisfied that there was no violation of the requirements. Id.  
 61. The Commission suggested that broadcasters could have simply used the phrase “Paid for by 
the Tobacco Industry” to satisfy their burden. Id. at 1447. This finding seems to directly contradict the 
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of Appeals confirmed the FCC’s decision.62 The court also suggested that 
neither precedent nor the legislative history of the regulations supported 
the Commission’s claimed ability to require broadcasters to engage in a 
full investigation to determine sponsors’ identities.63 Moreover, in the 
court’s view, the imposition of further duties on broadcasters could raise a 
myriad of issues and invite abuse, presumably by political opponents.
64
 
The court did note, however, the possibility of “so strong a circumstantial 
case that [a third party] other than the named sponsor is the real sponsor 
that licensees, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, would have to” 
name the third party.
65
 
Trumper Communications of Portland
66
 proved to be one such strong 
circumstantial case in which the broadcasters erred by failing to name the 
third party as the true sponsor. Yet despite finding a violation of the 
regulations, the FCC refused any enforcement measures and clearly 
reinforced the Loveday reasoning.
67
 The complaint alleged that several 
Portland, Oregon, stations had aired a series of advertisements 
misidentifying the Fairness Matters to Oregonians Committee (“FMOC”) 
as the sponsor, when in fact the true sponsor was The Tobacco Institute 
(“TBI”).68 The advertisements opposed a state ballot initiative to increase 
the tax on tobacco products, and the complainant showed that virtually all 
of FMOC’s funding came from TBI.69 The Commission noted that 
 
 
Commission’s reasoning in WHAS and the very reason for the 1975 revision to the regulations. See 
supra note 56. 
 62. Loveday’s appeal of the FCC’s decision went directly to the appellate court. Loveday, 707 
F.2d at 1447.  
 63. Id. at 1457–60. 
 64. Id. at 1449. The court believed the imposition of further investigatory duties created 
practical, administrative, and constitutional questions. Id. Practically, the court explained that 
broadcasters had different resources (e.g., personnel) to put toward such an investigation, and setting a 
high bar for investigation would strain those with fewer resources. Id. at 1457–60. Administratively, 
the Commission itself would have to expend many more resources in adjudicating whether 
broadcasters had met their investigatory burdens. Id. Constitutionally, the court expressed concern that 
the intrusive nature of the investigation would chill political speech in contravention of the First 
Amendment and allow political opponents to limit each other’s speech simply by raising doubts about 
sponsor identity, thereby leading to FCC investigation. Id. Nevertheless, it is important to note that in 
making this argument, the court assumed that the kind of investigation would be extremely in-depth, 
including “field investigations” and “observations of suspected persons.” Id. at 1457. 
 65. Id. at 1459. 
 66. Trumper Commc’n’s of Portland, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 20415 (1996). 
 67. See id. The Trumper decision was set forth in a letter to several broadcasters that had aired 
political advertisements by one sponsor. Id. at 20415. The Commission declined to pursue 
enforcement against the broadcasters and issued the letter as an “advisory” opinion. Id. at 20418. 
 68. Id. at 20415–16. 
 69. The complainant, the Media Access Project, showed that FMOC had raised $2,664,600, and 
TBI had contributed all but $20 of that sum, according to a filing with the Oregon Secretary of State. 
Id. 
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broadcasters were not required “to act as private investigators” and were 
only required to question assurances of the apparent sponsor if they were 
“furnished with credible, unrefuted evidence that a sponsor is acting at the 
direction of a third party.”70 In this instance, the Commission determined 
that there had been credible, unrefuted evidence provided to the stations 
because the complainants had shown that funding for the apparent sponsor 
and editorial control over that entity both came from TBI.
71
 As such, the 
stations had violated the regulations by failing to name TBI as the sponsor, 
but the Commission declined to pursue enforcement because it found that 
the stations had learned of the evidence less than two weeks before the 
advertisement aired.
72
 This outcome was somewhat confounding; the 
Commission identified two factors that constituted adequate evidence to 
warrant not accepting an apparent sponsor’s assurances, but it did not 
suggest that the stations had any duty to investigate this information 
themselves.
73
  
Between the inception of sponsorship identification law in 1934 and 
the 1975 revision to the regulations, the FCC made slow but significant 
progress toward providing viewers with complete and accurate 
sponsorship identification information. With Loveday and Trumper, 
however, the Commission significantly weakened the reasonable diligence 
and true sponsor identification requirements. Nearly forty years later, the 
FCC has all but done away with them.
74
  
IV. MODERN POLITICAL ADVERTISING & THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FCC’S 
APPROACH TO SPONSORSHIP IDENTIFICATION REGULATION 
The FCC’s decimation of the requirements that kept the voting public 
fully informed of hidden advertising particularly harms voters in modern 
political campaigns. The political landscape of the 2000s has been marked 
by steadily increasing campaign expenditures, including on television 
advertisements.
75
 In election year 2012, local TV broadcasters reported a 
 
 
 70. Id. at 20417.  
 71. Id. at 20417–18. 
 72. Id. at 20418. The Commission also suggested enforcement was inappropriate because the 
stations may have found a dearth of “definitive guidance” from the Commission. Id. at 20418. 
 73. Additionally, the Commission’s decision also seemed to imply some unspecified deadline, 
and if stations did not have such credible evidence before that time, then they would not be required to 
change their sponsorship announcements prior to airing the advertisements. See id. 
 74. See infra Part V.  
 75. Data from the political watchdog group Center for Responsive Politics chronicle the upward 
trend in campaign expenditures by both candidates and outside groups. The data for the 2004 election 
show that the two main presidential candidates, George W. Bush and John Kerry, spent approximately 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/9
  
 
 
 
 
2016] ANONYMOUS POLITICAL ADVERTISING 1119 
 
 
 
 
record-setting $2.9 billion in revenue from political broadcasting—an 
increase from $2.1 billion in 2010 and $1.5 billion in 2008.
76
 A great deal 
of the political messaging now comes from outside special interest groups, 
as evidenced by election data from races between 2008 and 2014.
77
 
 
 
$717.9 million on the race, collectively. Center for Responsive Politics, 2004 Presidential Race, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pres04/index.php?graph=spending (last visited Oct. 
13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8CHH-6YN6. The 2008 presidential race between John McCain 
and Barack Obama culminated in the two candidates spending approximately $1.06 billion on their 
campaigns. Center for Responsive Politics, Summary Data for Barack Obama, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/summary.php?cycle=2008&cid=N00009638 (last visited Oct. 13, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/2PFB-KG7J; Center for Responsive Politics, Summary Data for 
John McCain, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/summary.php?cycle=2008&cid 
=N00006424 (last visited Oct. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9CJ5-A6L4. The data for the 
2012 presidential election present even more impressive figures; including outside spending, 
candidates Barack Obama and Mitt Romney spent a total of approximately $2.4 billion on their 
campaigns altogether. Center for Responsive Politics, 2012 Presidential Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/index.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
WB9P-TF2Q. The increase in expenditures from previous campaigns corresponded with an increase in 
the number of political advertisements on the air; the 2012 presidential election yielded significantly 
more ads than each of the two preceding presidential elections. 2012 Shatters 2004 and 2008 Records 
for Total Ads Aired, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2012), http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/ 
releases/2012-shatters-2004-and-2008-records-for-total-ads-aired/, archived at http://perma.cc/VQ2P-
VAXX.  
 76. Deborah Potter et al., Local TV: By the Numbers, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://stateof 
themedia.org/2013/local-tv-audience-declines-as-revenue-bounces-back/local-tv-by-the-numbers/ (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/96F2-R9GG. The logical inference to draw from the 
increasing numbers is that they signal the established—or perhaps even growing—success of political 
advertising in persuading voting viewers. Somewhat surprisingly, there is debate among political 
strategists and political scientists on what, if any, effect political advertising has on viewers. STEPHEN 
ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: HOW POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS SHRINK 
AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE 17 (1995). For the sake of analyzing sponsorship identification 
regulations and their potential impact on the American public, this Note assumes political 
advertisements do affect voters. See, e.g., Michael M. Franz & Travis N. Ridout, Does Political 
Advertising Persuade?, 29 POL. BEHAV. 465, 485 (2007) (finding “ample evidence” that political ads 
influence voters’ choices and change their attitudes). But see Jonathan S. Krasno & Donald P. Green, 
Do Televised Presidential Ads Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 70 J. 
POL. 245, 258 (2008) (finding that political advertisements had minimal effect on voter turnout in the 
2000 general election). 
 77. No data was available on spending by outside groups in the 2004 presidential election. 
Outside groups spent $233.6 million in the 2008 race on all presidential candidates. Center for 
Responsive Politics, 2008 Presidential Race: Independent Expenditures, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/indexp.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/FD4E-ZWTP. Nearly tripling the figure from the previous election cycle, outside 
groups spent $652.81 million on the 2012 presidential race. Center for Responsive Politics, 2012 
Presidential Race: Independent Expenditures, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/ 
pres12/indexp.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/XE4S-7MD9. In the 2014 
midterm Congressional elections, outside groups spent approximately $795.5 million. Center for 
Responsive Politics, 2014 Outside Spending, by Group, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets. 
org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2014&chrt=V&disp=O&type=A (last visited Dec. 9, 2015).  
 In addition to increasing their spending on political ads, outside groups have also upped the 
number of advertisements they put on the airwaves. Data for the first two weeks of the “traditional 
campaign cycle” show that outside groups have significantly increased the number of ads they aired 
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While the sheer volume of ads and the corresponding expenditures may 
not be troubling in themselves, the anonymous messaging that can reach 
voters raises concerns. When considered in light of the frequently repeated 
refrain—from the FCC and the courts—that the public has a right to know 
when and by whom it is being persuaded, anonymous messaging is 
particularly troubling.
78
 The nature of persuasion in political advertising 
has three significant effects on voters that are problematic when messages 
are not accompanied by sponsor identification. First, when advertisement 
sponsors are not obviously affiliated or aligned with political parties, 
viewers assign more credibility to the message than if it came from a 
sponsor clearly identifying its political affiliations.
79
 Many outside groups 
airing a high volume of political advertisements have ambiguous names, 
such as “Club for Growth,” “Americans for Prosperity,” and “Patriot 
Majority USA.”80 Some groups purposefully use ambiguous names to 
 
 
between the 2010 midterm elections and the 2014 midterm elections. 2014 General Election 
Advertising Opens Even More Negative than 2010 or 2012, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT (Sept. 16, 
2014), http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/ releases/2014-general-election-advertising-opens-even-more-
negative-than-2010-or-2012/, archived at http://perma.cc/5TSK-539B. Outside groups aired 567 ads 
between August 29, 2010, and September 11, 2010; in contrast, outside groups in 2014 aired 40,897 
ads between August 29, 2014, and September 11, 2014, showing an approximately 7114 percent 
increase between the two cycles. Id. 
 78. See Amendment of Sections 3.119, 3.289, 3.654 and 3.789 of the Commission’s Rules, 34 
F.C.C. 829, 849 (1963) (stating knowledge of sponsor’s identity is “[p]aramount to an informed 
opinion and wisdom of choice”); see also Inquiry Concerning Sponsorship Identification 
Announcements by Station KOOL-TV on Behalf of Mr. Sam Grossman, 26 F.C.C.2d 42, 42 (1970) 
(stating that the “basic purpose” behind the FCC’s regulations and the Communications Act is 
ensuring that the public knows “by whom it is being persuaded”); Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (discussing campaign donor disclosure in the context of the FEC 
regulations, but noting the importance of identifying corporate donors for the purpose of “[enabling] 
the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and 
messages”). 
 79. Christopher Weber et al., It’s All in the Name: Source Cue Ambiguity and the Persuasive 
Appeal of Campaign Ads, 34 POL. BEHAV. 561, 579 (2012). Weber et al. found that “being 
unconnected to the race itself leads to more perceived sponsor credibility,” and “unknown political 
groups can be a powerful force in political communication.” Id. Specifically, political advertisements 
sponsored by interest groups in general were more persuasive to viewers than advertisements 
sponsored by the candidates themselves. Among those groups, viewers found “lesser-known, 
ambiguously named” outside groups credible and the authors labeled such unknown political groups a 
“powerful force in political communication.” Id. It bears noting that the authors acknowledged that 
ambiguously named outside groups added a “new layer of complexity” to the study of political 
advertising and require further scholarly attention to improve the understanding of their impact on 
viewers. Id.  
 80. All three named entities were among the top twenty special interest group spenders on 
political advertising in the 2014 midterm elections, as ranked by the Wesleyan Media Project. Heated 
Battle for U.S. Senate Draws Deluge of Outside Group Ads, Most Are Dark Money, WESLEYAN 
MEDIA PROJECT (Sept. 4, 2014), http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/releases/heated-battle-for-u-s-
senate-draws-deluge-of-outside-group-ads-most-are-dark-money/, archived at http://perma.cc/K8Q9-
QEE6. 
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obscure their political alignment and true agendas from viewers—a tactic 
that has proven effective.
81
 Second, because voters have become 
increasingly inundated with political messages over the last several 
election cycles, they may attach credibility to certain advertisements 
simply because of repeated exposure to the content.
82
 Moreover, in the 
echo chamber created by social media websites, like Facebook, the effects 
of repetition are significantly increased.
83
 Third, negative advertisements 
are more likely to provoke reactions in voters,
84
 and a growing number of 
 
 
 81. See Weber, supra note 79, at 564 (“With recent changes to American campaign finance law 
. . . an increasing number of political message sponsors are unknown, rendering it important to 
understand the consequences of these groups with respect to campaigning and political persuasion.”). 
Trends in 2014’s election spending suggest donations are increasingly going to groups that are not 
bound by the FEC’s donor disclosure requirements. Those groups are free to withhold donor names 
and present the public with “generic names and unclear agendas.” Nicholas Confessore, Secret Money 
Fueling a Flood of Political Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/ 
us/politics/ads-paid-for-by-secret-money-flood-the-midterm-elections.html?_r=0. Donors from both 
conservative and liberal ends of the spectrum have shifted their giving to non-disclosing groups, but 
conservative donors appear to donate to non-disclosing groups far more heavily than liberal donors. 
Approximately eighty percent of the election advertising in support of Republican candidates came 
from outside groups that do not disclose donor names. Id.  
 The tactic of purposefully keeping viewers ignorant has paid some dividends. See Andy Kroll, 
This Machine Turned Colorado Blue. Now It May Be Dems’ Best Hope to Save the Senate, MOTHER 
JONES (Oct. 29, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/colorado-udall-
hickenlooper-senate-democracy-alliance, archived at http://perma.cc/6VAJ-5Q8M. The phenomenon 
of obscuring donor identity and group agendas is not particularly new, but the practice may have 
increased after the Supreme Court ruled in Citizens United v. FEC that the donations of corporations to 
political candidates could not be limited. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371; see also Alison Fitzgerald 
& Jonathan D. Salant, Hiding the Identities of Mega-Donors, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 18, 
2012, 9:21 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-10-18/hiding-the-identities-of-mega-
donors#p1, archived at http://perma.cc/ZB43-8838.  
 82. Jeremy N. Sheff, The Myth of the Level Playing Field: Knowledge, Affect, and Repetition in 
Public Debate, 75 MO. L. REV. 143, 160–61 (2010). “[T]he ability to repeat a campaign message or 
secure repeated exposure for a political candidate has real potential to skew the results of an election in 
favor of a campaign that leverages that ability.” Id.; see also Lili Levi, Plan B for Campaign-Finance 
Reform: Can the FCC Help Save American Politics After Citizens United?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 
118–19 (2011).  
 83. Levi, supra note 82, at 119 (footnote omitted) (“[V]oters might assume the credibility of the 
nominal sponsor and all of its ads, and have no reason to assess the credibility of the ad’s true sponsor. 
This misdirected assumption of credibility can have significant consequences in today’s 
recommendation-based Facebook culture . . . .”). The prevalence of YouTube and other similar sites 
also make it easy to share online political advertisements that originally aired on television. 
 84. Samuel D. Bradley et al., Psychophysiological and Memory Effects of Negative Political Ads: 
Aversive, Arousing, and Well Remembered, 36 J. ADVERTISING 115, 116 (2007) (finding negative 
political ads to be memorable and to evoke physiological and emotional responses in viewers). 
Negative political advertisements reinforce those voters who have established political viewpoints, but 
they may also be more effective in persuading those who are “the undecided or in some rare instances 
[converting] the normally hostile audience.” KAREN S. JOHNSON-CARTEE & GARY A. COPELAND, 
NEGATIVE POLITICAL ADVERTISING: COMING OF AGE 13–14 (2013). Political scientists, however, 
have some disagreement as to whether negative advertising has any effect on actual political decision-
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1122 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1103 
 
 
 
 
political advertisements are negative in tone.
85
 Importantly, the viewers 
most affected by political advertisements with these three qualities are 
voters with low independent political knowledge.
86
 In other words, the 
people most vulnerable to the covert persuasion now permitted by lax 
enforcement of the sponsorship identification regulations are those most 
vulnerable to being misled or misinformed when they arrive at the ballot 
box. In sum, political advertising has been shaped—made anonymous, 
ubiquitous, and negative—to make it as persuasive to voters as possible. 
Thus, if the most persuasive advertisements are aired without proper 
sponsorship identification, the regulations and the FCC have failed. 
V. THE FCC’S VIRTUAL ABANDONMENT OF THE SPONSORSHIP 
IDENTIFICATION REGULATIONS & THE RESULTING IMPLICATIONS  
Nearly forty years after the decision in Loveday, the FCC has only 
become further entrenched in its refusal to enforce the sponsorship 
identification regulations, even as anonymous political advertising grows 
more common. Two recent decisions in which the Commission declined 
enforcement confirm its position. In 2014, several media watchdog groups 
jointly filed two complaints with the FCC alleging that television stations 
failed to identify the true sponsors behind political advertisements. In the 
first complaint, the groups alleged that WJLA, a Washington, D.C., news 
station, aired political advertisements related to the Virginia gubernatorial 
election and identified the sponsor as NextGen Climate Action Committee 
(“NextGen”).87 The complainants alleged that WJLA knew the true 
sponsor to be Tom Steyer, billionaire philanthropist and founder of 
NextGen.
88
 On its news program, the station itself had reported on 
NextGen’s—and specifically on Steyer’s—expenditures to push 
environmental issues to the forefront of the race.
89
 This left the station 
 
 
making. See Richard R. Lau et al., The Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: A Meta-Analytic 
Reassessment, 69 J. POL. 1176, 1176 (2007). 
 85. See 2014 General Election Advertising Opens Even More Negative than 2010 or 2012, supra 
note 77.  
 86. See Franz & Ridout, supra note 76, at 485. 
 87. See generally Complaint of Campaign Legal Center et al. v. ACC Licensee, LLC, Licensee of 
WJLA-TV, at 1–2, INST. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, available at http://instituteforpublicrepresentation 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/WJLA-Complaint-Final.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7TJY-3NC4. 
 88. Id. at 6–7. Moreover, the complaint argued, even a cursory scan of NextGen’s website 
prominently displayed Steyer as both founder and president of the organization. Id. 
 89. Id. at 6–9. The complaint alleged WJLA aired two political advertisements with improper 
sponsorship announcements in September and October 2013. Id. at 1. In August 2013, the station’s 
news department aired a story and posted to its website that Steyer would be injecting a substantial 
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with little excuse for failing to identify Steyer as the true sponsor.
90
 In the 
second complaint, the complainants alleged that an Oregon news station, 
KGW, failed to exercise reasonable diligence in naming the American 
Principles Fund (“APF”) as a political advertisement sponsor.91 The 
complainants urged that KGW could have easily accessed the Federal 
Election Commission’s (“FEC”) online records and quickly determined 
that nearly 99 percent of APF’s funding came from Sean Fieler, the 
founder and one of three self-described “leaders” of the group.92 That 
would have indicated that Fieler was the true sponsor to identify in the 
advertisement. 
 
 
amount of money into the election in support of candidate Terry McAuliffe. Id. at 8. Even if not for 
this report, the complaint argued the station’s employees should have consulted with its sister 
publication, Politico, which had reported at length on Steyer and NextGen based on the “extensive 
behind-the-scenes access” its reporters had to “Steyer’s shadow campaign.” Id. Politico’s reports had 
acknowledged Steyer as the sole funder of NextGen. Id. at 8–9. By the plain language in the 
regulations, the complainants urged that WJLA had failed to make reasonably diligent efforts to obtain 
information from its employees (in this instance, the news reporters) to make an adequate sponsorship 
announcement. Id. 
 90. The complainants urged that even a simple web search would have satisfied the “reasonable 
diligence” requirement and yielded the information necessary to make the proper sponsorship 
announcement identifying Steyer. Id. at 9. 
 91. Complaint of Campaign Legal Center et al. v. Sander Media, LLC, Licensee of KGW, at 6–7, 
INST. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, http://instituteforpublicrepresentation.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/07/KGW-Complaint-Final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5XKP-WJZJ. KGW aired the 
advertisement in question on multiple occasions in May 2014. Id. The advertisement criticized Oregon 
Republican senatorial candidate Monica Wehby for her stance on abortion and healthcare, and it urged 
voters to support candidate Jason Conger in the Republican primary. Id. at 5–6. As it turned out, 
Wehby won the Republican nomination over Conger but lost in the senatorial race to the incumbent 
candidate. Jeff Mapes, Jeff Merkley Defeats Monica Wehby in U.S. Senate Race: Oregon Election 
Results 2014, THE OREGONIAN (Nov. 4, 2014, 11:14 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/mapes/ 
index.ssf/2014/11/jeff_merkley_leads_monica_wehb.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y4BT-4F7E. 
 92. Complaint of Campaign Legal Center et al. v. Sander Media, LLC, Licensee of KGW, supra 
note 91, at 7–9. The complainants argued that KGW failed to make reasonably diligent efforts to 
discern the identity of the sponsor from those “with whom it [dealt] directly in connection,” as 
required by the Communications Act and the FCC’s regulations. Id. at 8 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 317(c)); 
see also supra note 39 and accompanying text. Even if APF had not cooperated in revealing Fieler as 
the true sponsor, the complainants believed that KGW still had the duty and ability to determine his 
role in the organization. Complaint of Campaign Legal Center et al. v. Sander Media, LLC, Licensee 
of KGW, supra note 91, at 8. Specifically, the complainants argued that a simple search of the FEC’s 
online database yielded information indicating that Fieler provided 98.6 percent of the funding for 
APF (approximately $700,000) in the year leading up to the airing of the advertisement in May 2014. 
Id. at 7–8. Moreover, even if KGW did not search the FEC’s website and relied instead on a Google 
word search, the complainants claimed it was “widely reported and readily discernible” that Fieler 
funded APF virtually entirely on his own. Id. The American Principles website even described Fieler 
as “Chairman,” and depicted two other individuals on the “leadership team.” Id. at 4–5. Based on all of 
this information, the complainants surmised that “APF would not be running any ads without Fieler’s 
money, and he remains free to stop supporting APF if it ran ads contrary to his interests. APF, in 
effect, acts as Fieler’s political advertising arm.” Id. at 7. In sum, the complaint asserted that Fieler had 
financial and editorial control over APF. 
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The FCC refused to initiate enforcement action in both complaints. In a 
single letter to the complainants, the Commission explained that the 
stations did not have “credible evidence casting into doubt” the sponsors’ 
identities.
93
 The FCC’s sole explanation quoted Trumper Communications 
that only “credible, unrefuted evidence” of a third party as the true sponsor 
would be sufficient to require broadcasters to name someone other than 
the apparent sponsor.
94
 The lack of clarity is especially stark because the 
Commission answered both complaints with one letter, ignoring the fact 
that they posed two vastly different factual scenarios.
95
 The Commission 
indicated that it reached a decision by balancing the reasonable diligence 
obligations with “the sensitive First Amendment interests present.”96 But it 
gave no further explanation of the nature of the First Amendment interests, 
nor did it indicate how the balancing process played out.
97
 The letter 
concluded by noting that the Commission’s “approach might have been 
different” if the complainants had contacted the stations first and provided 
evidence identifying the true sponsors.
98
 The implications of this most 
recent decision reaches broadcasters, voters, special interest groups, and 
the FCC itself. 
A. Implications for Broadcasters 
For broadcasters, little has changed since Loveday and Trumper 
Communications, and the duties imposed by the law may have in fact 
diminished even further. While the FCC’s letter is brief, it speaks volumes 
 
 
 93. Letter from Robert L. Baker, Assistant Chief, Policy Division of Media Bureau, Fed. 
Commc’n’s Comm’n, to Andrew Jay Schwartzman, Attorney, Inst. for Pub. Representation (Sept. 2, 
2014), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/ edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-14-1267A1.pdf. 
 94. Id. (quoting Trumper Commc’n’s of Portland, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 20415 (1996)). 
 95. In fact, while the Commission’s letter generally references both complaints, it never makes 
specific mention of the allegations against KGW. See id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. While the Commission makes no explanation of the First Amendment interests in this 
letter, the Sixth Circuit included a discussion of its concerns in its Loveday opinion. Loveday v. FCC, 
707 F.2d 1443, 1458–59 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The court cited precedent indicating that broadcast speech 
receives the most limited First Amendment protection because the use of broadcasting facilities is not 
equally available to all members of the public, and so the area is subject to government regulation. Id. 
at 1458. Nevertheless, the lack of First Amendment protection was the relic of a time with far fewer 
broadcasting facilities; because television and radio stations have proliferated in recent decades, the 
court surmised the protection for broadcast speech “may well expand.” Id. at 1459. Given this 
development, “the law’s attempt to discover the true utterers of political messages becomes so 
intrusive and burdensome that it threatens to silence or make ineffective the speech” and intrudes on 
the First Amendment. Id. Importantly, the court wrote that in order to interpret the law as requiring 
broadcasters to “affirmatively seek out true sponsors,” it would require clear legislative intent from 
Congress indicating the law was intended to have that effect. Id.  
 98. Letter from Robert L. Baker, supra note 93. 
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about the agency’s stance on what it expects of broadcasters in “fully and 
fairly” disclosing the identities of sponsors—it effectively expects nothing. 
First, the WJLA example is telling.
99
 As Trumper suggested, WJLA would 
not be required to further investigate if NextGen made assurances that it 
was the true sponsor.
100
 But the Commission went a step beyond Trumper 
and further gutted the reasonable diligence requirement by refusing to 
even penalize the station for failure to communicate with its own 
employees who obviously had knowledge of the true identity of the 
sponsor because of their news stories.
101
 Second, the FCC’s resolution of 
the allegations against KGW further relieves broadcasters of any duty to 
determine the true sponsor of an advertisement. Trumper suggested 
broadcasters had no duty to look beyond apparent sponsor assurances, 
except in cases with strong circumstantial evidence of financial and 
editorial control by a third party.
102
 In KGW, both of those factors appear 
to be present,
103
 as they were in Trumper, but the FCC reaches differing 
decisions in the two cases and gives no explanation. The KGW decision 
apparently removes the Trumper exception, and broadcasters now seem to 
have no duty whatsoever to seek out true sponsors in any case. Further, the 
FCC’s decision here highlights that the burden of diligence that exists now 
falls on interested third parties looking to expose hidden sponsors in 
political advertisements.
104
  
B. Implications for Voters 
For voters, the implications are sobering. The 2016 elections are nearly 
certain to prompt record expenditures on political advertising, just as they 
have in each of the recent elections.
105
 Now, perhaps more than ever 
 
 
 99. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 100. See generally Trumper Commc’n’s of Portland, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 20415 (1996). 
 101. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 317(c) (2014); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(b) (2016). 
 102. See Trumper Commc’n’s of Portland, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. at 20417. 
 103. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.  
 104. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. Trumper explains that broadcasters must be 
“furnished with” credible and unrefuted evidence before being required to change sponsorship 
announcements. They have no obligation to seek this information of their own accord. Trumper 
Commc’n’s of Portland, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. at 20417. 
 This is welcome news for broadcasters. Broadcasters remain free to accept lucrative payments for 
airtime from political groups without having to ask any questions. See, e.g., Joseph Tanfani, Surge in 
Midterm Election Campaign Spending a Boon for TV Broadcasters, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014, 5:00 
AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-tv-campaign-ads-20141028-story.html#page=1, archived 
at http://perma.cc/V3CL-55TL. Election years can mean an increase of up to thirty percent in revenues 
for broadcasters, and the surge in spending has even required some stations to change their sales 
practices to accommodate the booming demand for airtime. Id. 
 105. Heated Battle for U.S. Senate Draws Deluge of Outside Group Ads, supra note 80. 
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because of the sheer amount of political advertising, it is vital that voters 
know the source of persuasion when they are bombarded by political 
advertisements on television, the radio, and the Internet. The influence of 
persuasive and perhaps misleading advertisements aired by special interest 
groups and wealthy individuals, like Steyer and Fieler, is certain to remain 
steady and may well grow commensurate with campaign spending by 
outside sources. Even further, those voters with the least political 
knowledge, and thus those most vulnerable to political misinformation, are 
at the greatest risk of being affected by the misleading advertisements. If 
the FCC persists in refusing enforcement, the onus for creating change lies 
elsewhere. Broadcasters profit too greatly from political advertisement 
revenues to initiate change.
106
 Congress, too, is unlikely to act.
107
 There is 
little incentive for lawmakers to change the regulations to reveal money 
from special interest groups in political advertising because the very 
election of those lawmakers may depend on such contributions.
108
 
Consequently, only interested third parties, like the complainants in 
Loveday, Trumper, and the 2014 complaints, remain to shed light on the 
hidden sponsors of political advertisements. Relying on these groups for 
enforcement of the regulations is unlikely to yield results, and any results 
that do emerge are likely to be inconsistent at best. But it is more likely to 
yield no result at all, as it did in the 2014 complaints. Ultimately, the result 
may be a misinformed or misled electorate. 
C. Implications for Special Interest Groups 
This is, of course, welcome news for special interest groups and PACs 
aiming to anonymously persuade voters. A growing amount of attention 
has turned to the amount of “dark money,” or corporate and special 
 
 
 106. See Tanfani, supra note 104; see also, e.g., Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure 
Requirements for Television Broadcast Licensee Public Interest Obligations, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,631 
(May 11, 2012) (discussing the agency’s 2012 revisions to the political file requirement in the 
sponsorship identification regulations and repeatedly taking note of the National Association for 
Broadcasters’ objections to increasing burdens on broadcasters related to political advertisement).  
 107. See supra note 97. The appellate court in Loveday suggested that Congressional action was 
necessary in order for courts to interpret the regulations as requiring broadcasters to investigate beyond 
assurances from apparent sponsors to determine if a third party is the true sponsor. Loveday v. FCC, 
707 F.2d 1443, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 108. In this sense, misidentified donors in political advertisements differ from undisclosed 
sponsorships in the payola scandal—the only other instance in which Congress has intervened to 
strengthen sponsorship identification requirements. In the latter, the group most seriously affected by 
the crackdown or change in law was the record stations and the disc jockeys, not lawmakers. See supra 
Part III.B. 
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interest funding, that has poured into recent elections.
109
 That kind of 
public attention on the misleading and arguably unethical tactic may bode 
ill for those special interest groups in the long term, but it seems highly 
unlikely that the FCC will be instrumental in ending the practice.
110
 If any 
such change is to occur, Congress is the most likely source of reform, just 
as it was in the payola scandal.
111
 Again, the chance of Congressional 
action seems dim. 
D. Implications for the FCC 
Lastly, because of the 2014 decisions, the FCC is likely to see 
continued complaints by interested third parties seeking to enforce the 
regulations. The Commission has made clear that it does not require 
broadcasters to undertake any investigation of their own in satisfying the 
reasonable diligence requirement.
112
 It has left open, however, the 
possibility that other interested parties may be able to trigger a change in 
sponsorship announcements by directly presenting evidence to 
broadcasters that a third party is the true sponsor.
113
 Nevertheless, it is 
unclear when and what kind of evidence must be presented in order to 
trigger a broadcaster to change a sponsorship announcement, or to trigger 
the FCC to enforce its regulations.
114
 Because the agency has provided 
minimal guidance, it is likely that similar complaints will continue to be 
filed by interested parties looking to enforce the regulations.
115
 Based on 
 
 
 109. See Confessore, supra note 81. 
 110. Groups that fall into that category—those looking to covertly persuade the public through 
political advertisements—may be more common than the average viewer suspects. See, e.g., Kroll, 
supra note 81. 
 111. In a sense, the media hype surrounding the influx of dark money parallels the media hype in 
the early 1950s about payola practices. See supra Part III.B. In both instances, the maligned practices 
(payment to disc jockeys and obscuring identities of political donors) are well documented by the 
press. But in both instances, the FCC enforcement efforts (or lack thereof) do nothing to strengthen or 
reinforce the regulations. However, unlike the payola scandal, it is not clear that the rising expenditure 
on political advertising and the role of dark money groups will prompt Congressional investigation and 
action as payola did in 1960. Moreover, Congress itself has a vested stake in the practices of dark 
money groups, but this was not the case with payola. 
 112. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 114. Despite the insinuation in the 2014 letter, it also remains unclear whether complainants can 
ever successfully trigger enforcement if they approach the Commission before the broadcasters. See 
supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 115. Harry Cole, Issue-Oriented Spots: Who’s the REAL Sponsor?, COMMLAWBLOG (Sept. 4, 
2014), http://www.commlawblog.com/2014/09/articles/broadcast/issue-oriented-spots-whos-the-real-
sponsor/, archived at http://perma.cc/73XX-B3PV; see also Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure 
Requirements for Television Broadcast Licensee Public Interest Obligations, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,631 
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historical precedent, this may prompt greater clarification from the FCC 
on its own, lead complainants to appeal in civil court, and/or become the 
source of media attention. If none of the above takes place, both 
complainants and viewers will remain at a disadvantage.
116
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The area of sponsorship identification law has been developing since 
1934, but the FCC has effectively stripped the regulations of all meaning 
at a time when the service they provide for the public is most crucial. After 
revisions of the Communications Act and the FCC's regulations in 1963 
and 1975, the law left little room for broadcasters to turn a blind eye to 
advertisement sponsors who sought to air their paid content anonymously. 
These victories for keeping viewers informed were short lived. Since 
1975, the interpretation and enforcement of the regulations by the FCC 
and federal courts have left broadcasters with minimal duties and viewers 
with little protection against those “glossy and sometimes wildly 
misleading ads.”117 In a sense, the duties of broadcasters have returned to 
what they were at the time the Radio Act of 1927 was passed: the only 
guarantee that comes with sponsored political content is that the 
broadcaster will identify that it is sponsored. 
Political campaigns in the twenty-first century are the most expensive 
in history, and wealthy individuals and special interest groups are among 
those endeavoring to affect election outcomes. In the realm of political 
advertisement, that sometimes means expending large sums of money 
through innocuously-named intermediaries to buy airspace and seek to 
persuade the public. That tactic has proven effective in persuading voters, 
and there is ample reason to believe that special interest groups will 
continue to utilize it. The FCC’s interpretation of sponsorship 
identification laws does little to counteract this purposefully misleading 
advertising, and the agency’s approach to enforcement serves the goals of 
those seeking to obscure their involvement in campaigning for certain 
candidates.  
If the Commission centered its interpretation on the plain language of 
the laws and regulations, sponsorship identification would be successful in 
achieving its purpose. Identifying the true sponsors behind political 
 
 
(May 11, 2012) (describing the FCC’s discussion of the comments received in relation to the 2012 
revisions).  
 116. See generally Levi, supra note 82. 
 117. Press Release, Michael J. Copps, supra note 1. 
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advertisements would mean providing voters with information about who 
seeks to persuade them and why. Armed with that information, voters are 
better able to evaluate the contents of a message, to understand 
advertisers’ agendas, to exercise the option to resist or embrace the 
persuasive effect of repeated advertising, and to consider the truthfulness 
or validity of negative attack advertisements. But the FCC has not based 
its interpretation on the plain language of the law, and it has instead 
chosen to gut the law of all meaning. This choice defeats the very purpose 
of sponsorship identification law, and it only ensures a higher likelihood 
that voters arrive at the ballot box misinformed. 
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